After a long work that lasted 7 years, on July 6, 2016, the report of the British Independent Commission on the participation of British troops in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was released.
If we want to call a spade a spade without embellishing it, we can summarize the content of this final report prepared by an independent commission led by Sir “John Chilcot” on the participation of British troops in the invasion and destruction of Iraq during the period 2003-2009, stating, that he came to the following conclusions:
- The decision to invade was wrong and was not based on good or convincing reasons.
- Britain, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, followed the US with its eyes closed.
- Britain participated in this shadowy invasion and occupation legally and morally based on suspicion and fabrication.
- The presence of British troops in this country for six years as a participant in the occupation was absurd.
This important and accurate “technical” report is 12 volumes long and 2.6 million words were used in its wording, prompting the British press to compare its scope to major literary classics.
The delay in the publication of the Chilcot report is due, according to what was reported in the local press, to disputes and disputes between the commission and the British government over whether to disclose “a number of classified material, including the contents of conversations between former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former US President George W. Bush.
The British Independent Commission report lists its findings on the “circumstances” of the British Army’s involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq: “The United Kingdom decided to join the invasion of Iraq before peaceful disarmament options had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not the last resort.
We also concluded that:
- Judgments about the seriousness of the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are made with unfounded certainty.
- Despite clear warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. Planning and preparation for the post-Saddam Hussein period was grossly inadequate.
The report of the British Select Committee on Iraq describes how the British authorities decided to participate in the invasion, noting that “Prime Minister Tony Blair reviewed Iraq’s past, present and future possibilities in the House of Commons on 24 September 2002.” as evidence of the serious threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.” He said that this threat will become a reality at some point in the future.
The conclusions about Iraq’s military capabilities contained in this statement and the dossier published on the same day are presented with unfounded certainty.
The JIC should have made it clear to Blair that intelligence analysis does not allow us to say with certainty that Iraq continues to produce chemical and biological weapons, and also continues to develop nuclear weapons.
While the Chilcot Report disproved and invalidated the grounds on which the British Government had relied in its decision to participate in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, it stated the following:
The Commission of Inquiry did not express its opinion on the legality of the hostilities. Of course, only a duly convened internationally recognized court can decide this. However, we have come to the conclusion that the circumstances in which the existence of a legal basis for British military action was found to be by no means satisfactory.
Blair received his share of criticism in this report, since, according to him, he told the commission of inquiry that “the difficulties facing Iraq could not have been foreseen in advance.”
“We do not agree that this required any special forethought. The danger of internal division in Iraq, the desire of Iran to defend its interests, regional instability and the activities of Al-Qaeda in Iraq were known even before the invasion.
The British Special Inquiry Commission touched upon the outcome of what it called the “Iraq conflict”, noting that it had caused “the death of over 200 British citizens. Many people were injured. This caused great suffering to many families. , some of which are here today…as the invasion and further instability as of July 2009 has claimed the lives of 150,000 Iraqis…More than a million people have lost their homes. The Iraqis have suffered greatly.”
The report addressed the incident, which he described as humiliating for Britain, noting that “in 2007, paramilitary groups took control of Basra and British forces were unable to resist them, which led to the release of detainees in exchange for an end to attacks on the British.” It is humiliating that the UK is in such a position that a deal with a paramilitary group attacking its own forces is the best possible option.
The British Commission of Inquiry summarized its overall position on the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by stating that on that particular day it observed the following:
- Saddam Hussein posed no direct threat.
- It was necessary to choose a containment strategy for a certain period.
- Most members of the UN Security Council spoke in favor of continuing the missions of international inspectors and observers.
Source: RT